

abilities of independent existence. All the points duly considered—the actual destruction of slave property, the loss of income resulting from the disappearance of slave labor, the impossibility of cultivating the soil for want of labor, the existence of an enormous body of negro paupers, and the destruction of the credit of States which have \$130,000,000 of bonds in circulation—it must be admitted that the probable consequences of a war between the North and the border States are, in a commercial point of view, more grave than anything that can grow out of the contest between the United States and Mr. Davis' Gulf rebels.

At the same time it cannot be denied that the Gulf rebels are pursuing a course which is calculated to interfere very seriously with American commerce. It is idle to doubt that Mr. Davis can obtain men both at the South and at the North to man piratical expeditions under the guise of letters of marque. The Matagorda, a well armed steamer, has already sailed from Texas to intercept the California treasure ships. The Star of the West has been taken into New Orleans, a prize to the South. Other ships and steamers are being fitted out as privateers at other Southern ports. Of course these privateers will, in due course of time, be seized by our cruisers, and their officers and crews hanged at the yard arm. But, in the meantime, many peaceful merchant ships will probably have been seized by them, and their cargoes sold at some West Indian or South American port. The administration has proclaimed a blockade of the Southern ports. But no steps have yet been taken to render the blockade effectual at Galveston, New Orleans, Mobile, Apalachicola, Savannah or Charleston. While we write privateers are doubtless putting to sea from all these ports. Very grave apprehensions are entertained by our merchants that the administration is not alive to the importance of the interests involved, and is not pursuing a sufficiently vigorous policy to crush out piracy at once and forever.

The events of the past day and two present other considerations of no less importance to the mercantile community. There is no room now for doubt as to the political affinities of the people of Maryland—or at all events of Baltimore. That city, which the Western States have built up so that it now stands third among American seaports, has pursued a course which will probably involve fatal injury to its future prospects. So long as this war lasts, Baltimore must be classed among the doubtful ports. Goods can no longer be safely sent to Baltimore, either from abroad or from the interior. Property sent to Baltimore may any day be seized by rebels, or destroyed in a conflict between the government troops and the insurgents. The city itself may be sacked. At any rate, whatever may be thought of the loyalty of the people of Baltimore, there can be but little doubt of the complicity of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and its officers with the secessionists. As long ago as February last, when the great Railroad Convention was held at Washington, our Northern railway managers returned with the firm conviction that John W. Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and his officers, were heart and soul with the disunionists. The events of the past few days—the refusal of the officers of the road to transport United States troops, the alacrity with which Virginia secessionists were moved from point to point, the tame submission of Mr. Garrett to the demands of the Baltimore mob, his meek acquiescence in the destruction of his bridges—all point clearly to a conclusion which ought to render the officers of this road the subject of an inquiry by the United States courts. Whether the law can be so interpreted as to forfeit the road to the government as an instrument of treason—as a privateer would be forfeited in the like case—is a question for the United States Attorney to decide. At any rate common prudence would seem to require that for the present, at all events, it should be seized and operated exclusively for the benefit of the government.

At the recent meeting of merchants in this city, a committee was appointed to provide for the negotiation of whatever loans might be required by the government. It is understood that they are discussing the subject, with a view to placing some \$50,000,000 at once at Mr. Chase's disposal. We hope there will be no hurry in the matter. Our stock market just now is under the influence of a panic, which will subside as soon as the fate of Washington is determined. In all human probability, money will be worth three per cent here in June, and government stock will be worth par. If Mr. Chase can possibly defer any calls on our mercantile community till then, he should do so. There will be no difficulty in borrowing, say ten millions a month, in New York; but it will injure the government credit to attempt a negotiation in the midst of the present panic. As soon as the flurry subsides Mr. Chase may come into the market for fifteen or twenty millions, and by giving, say fifty days notice, and offering certificates from \$50 upwards, may get the whole on at least as favorable terms as the last loan. But nothing should be done at present. In the meantime about \$1,300,000 are due to the government from successful bidders for the loan of 1860, awarded on 23d October last. The public, and especially the honorable firms which lived up to their contracts for that loan, at a heavy loss, are puzzled to understand the negligence which Mr. Chase has exhibited with regard to the defaulters. Why have they not been sued, and compelled to pay up? Must it be understood that, under the administration of Mr. Chase, a contract with the government is a mere empty formality, which need not be fulfilled unless it is quite convenient? If so, such houses as Whitehouse, Scott & Morison; Ward, Campbell & Co., and others which kept their faith honorably with the government, at a heavy sacrifice to themselves or their customers, have been duped. Some of the defaulters are members of the Board of Brokers. It is a little remarkable that no motion has ever been made in the Board to vacate the seats of the members who defaulted on their contracts with the government. Does the Board of Brokers consider a contract with the government not binding? If not, how can it overlook a notorious breach of such a contract?

The following are the trade tables for the week—

	Imports.	Exports.	Balance.
For the week.	\$1,048,500	\$1,048,500	0
Previously reported.	\$1,048,500	\$1,048,500	0
Since January 1.	\$1,048,500	\$1,048,500	0
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Previously reported.	\$1,048,500	\$1,048,500	0
Since January 1.	\$1,048,500	\$1,048,500	0

The banks, probably, continue to gain specie from the Mint at Philadelphia, and notwithstanding the rate of exchange, small amounts continue to arrive from England. Last Monday they showed a specie advance of \$41,704,748—an increase of \$59,190 from the previous week; in that last day the average was only \$23,626,982. There seems to be no present prospect of any decrease of the reserve; and as the Sub-Treasury discharges the money now held in that institution, the banks will naturally gain specie. The loans stood last Monday at \$123,108,885—an increase of \$195,389 from the week previous; at the corresponding date last year—they stood at \$129,019,015. But for the recent government loans the bank discounts would have fallen by this time considerably below \$120,000,000; and from present appearances this will be the principal resource of the banks for some time to come. Times like these test the

management of banks. A bank which can continue to earn dividends without encroaching upon its surplus this summer may be set down as very well managed.

Money is as easy as ever, on call, on the right kind of security, or for the best description of paper. But great care is exercised in selecting paper, very few lenders being willing to buy names in the Southern trade at any price. It seems to be generally understood that a very small proportion of the debts due by the South to the North will ever be collected; the credit of parties who are known or believed to have large amounts due can at the South suffer in consequence. On call, very few bankers care to lend on slave State stocks, even with any margin. The course pursued by Virginia has shaken public confidence in the honor of the people of the border States, and absolute repudiation would not now cause much surprise. On railroad stocks and bonds, the brokers borrow at a 5 per cent. First class paper, in the Northern trade, goes at 7/8 a 7, according to length, &c.

There was little or nothing done yesterday or Friday in foreign exchange. Bankers' rates, which are nominal, are 107 1/4 for sterling bills, and 5.30 for francs. But there is no demand at those rates, and no evidence that there would be any demand if they were lowered. Some good produce bills go at 105 1/4 a 106 1/4; but these are scarce. It looks as though we might witness another collapse in exchange next week; as the Bank of England has lowered its rate to 6 per cent, a further fall would probably lead to fresh importations of specie.

The following table shows the course of the stock market during the past week and month—

It will thus be seen that there has been quite a collapse in stocks within the week. The decline is equal to 23 per cent in Pacific Mail, 12½ in Panama, 5½ in Hudson River, 4½ in Central, 5½ in Reading, 7 in Erie, 9 in Michigan Central, 5½ in guaranteed, 12 in Illinois Central, 13½ in Galena, 14½ in Rock Island, 6½ in Toledo. State stocks have fallen still more severely. Missouri are 18½ lower than they were a week ago, Virginia 31 per cent, Tennessee 30 per cent, Kentucky 22 per cent. The fall in these securities has been unexampled, and must lead to the suspension of the bulk of the Western banks, whose currency is based on them. United States stocks have declined 3 per cent, and are not much dealt in. There is in the Board of Brokers a very honorable repugnance to selling them short, or trying to depress them in any way.